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# **National Intelligence Daily**

Friday 19 January 1979

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19 January 1979

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IRAN  A representative of Mehdi Bazargan, leader of th Liberation Movement of Iran, told US diplomats yester that Bazargan expects Prime Minister Bakhtiar will tr fer power to Khomeini's Islamic Revolutionary Council after Khomeini announces its composition, probably to or tomorrow. Bazargan believes, the representative added, that Khomeini will return possibly within two weeks.  We do not know if Bakhtiar or Khomeini endorse Bazargan's scenario for this orderly transfer of powe Bazargan enjoys Khomeini's trust, and Khomeini's enfourage in Paris reportedly is in contact with him.  If Bakhtiar is willing to cede power to Khomeini along the lines Bazargan has outlined, the key questi will be the attitude of the military leaders. Many senior officers have deferred plans for a coup to giv Bakhtiar a chance but they are not likely to acquiesc in Khomeini's assumption of power. On the other hand they are probably also aware that a coup would have little prospect now of restoring order in the long ru and would risk civil war.  Separatist Unrest  The Iranian military announced yesterday that Kurdish dissidents attacked a small gendarmerie post Kordestan Province three miles from the Iranian ground Earlier this week the commander of the Iranian ground		Top Secret
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forces told US officials that he was contraditional insurgencies may develop in inces like Baluchestan and Kordestan.	outlying prov- 25X1
A weakening of the central governme historically been followed by separatist country's minorities. So far we have no tion that major unrest is developing in provinces, but significant upheavals are crisis continues indefinitely. Unrest a ties like the Kurds and the Baluchis wou powers an opportunity to intervene.	moves among the t had any indica-the outlying likely if the mong the minori-

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

USSR-IRAN: Treaty of 1921

Recent Soviet references to the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 appear designed to underscore Moscow's warnings against US military involvement in Iran rather than to prepare a pretext for Soviet intervention. Article Six of the treaty, which the Iranians have long considered null and void, states that the USSR has the "right to send its army into Iran" if third countries intend to "pursue a policy of transgression in Iranian territory."

An exchange of letters between the two governments in 1921 made it clear that the USSR would have the right to intervene militarily in Iran only to counter White Russian forces. This, however, did not prevent the USSR from invoking the treaty when it occupied northern Iran 25X1 in 1941.

Earlier this month, an Izvestia article mentioned the treaty in the course of a pedestrian account of Soviet-Iranian relations. The article appeared to signal Moscow's direct interest in the outcome of the Iranian crisis and to amplify Soviet warnings against US intervention. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official remarked last week that the article was a reminder that the Soviets have interests in Iran that should be taken into account, but was not intended as a warning of possible Soviet intervention.

The references to the treaty thus far are consistent with President Brezhnev's statement on 19 November that 25X1 any interference in the affairs of a state bordering the USSR would be regarded as affecting Soviet security.

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LEBANON: Israeli Raid	
Israeli ground forces supported by artillery crossed the Litani River last night and attacked two Palestinian bases in southeastern Lebanon. The raid apparently lasted only a few hours; Israeli spokesm announced early this morning that units involved in attack had already been withdrawn.	d en
Press accounts indicate that Palestinian artil responded to the raid by firing on nearby Christian towns. Some areas of northern Israel apparently ar alerted to possible terrorist retaliation.	-held e
The raid, the second this week, was the first ground incursion by Israeli forces since the large-invasion of southern Lebanon last spring. It also marked the first time Israeli ground forces have cr the Litani River from northern Israel. The Israeli tion follows two terrorist incidents earlier this w	ossed ac-
The attack came as the UN Security Council is bating the renewal of the mandate for UNIFIL, the U peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. The curren mandate expires tonight.	N's
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ITALY: Communist Attack on Government	
The directorate of the Italian Comm terday issued its harshest attack uet on government.  are considering withdrawing their suppor Christian Democratic government—which t and four other parties back in parliamen hope to avoid a governmental collapse and mentary elections. The statement yester flects Communist chief Berlinguer's convergence arrangement is hurting the party its electoral base if allowed to continue	the Andreotti he Communists t for the 25X1 he Communists tbut that they d early parlia- day clearly re- iction that the and could erode
In their statement the Communists as Christian Democrats of reneging on their consult the party on major government pochange for its parliamentary support. The also claimed to see a conservative resurce Christian Democratic Party and were critical Democratic chief Zaccagnini's consultation leaders last week.	agreement to licies in ex- he Communists gence in the ical of Christian
Berlinguer is a Communist support for the government can if the party is given an expanded role in ment's decisionmaking process. There are within the party on the question of aband jority, however, and Berlinguer is explore possibilities that would stop short of a with the Andreotti government and allow soffice. These apparently include continuparliamentary support on "selective" issument to ensure a more direct Communist vogovernmental affairs.	continue only the govern- divisions doning the ma- ring several complete break it to remain in ling Communist les and an agree-
Andreotti has not yet responded to to statement. In the meantime, the continuit consultations preceding formal parliament Andreotti's economic plan, now under way ernment, the parties and the labor unions reactions to the Communist move and help future of the government.	ing series of cary debate on between the goves, should produce
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
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UK: Strike Situation
Prime Minister Callaghan may have to rethink his decision not to declare a state of national emergency if there is no progress in settling the truck drivers' strike by this weekend. The strike and a rash of strikes in other sectors are likely to have serious economic and political consequences.  25X1
The situation may be eased temporarily by a new agreement between the government and union leaders to stop picketing firms not directly involved in the strike and by encouraging the truckers to deliver essential goods. The drivers, however, have shown no inclination to back down and may simply ignore the new ground rules.
The strikes almost certainly will result in wage increases well above the government's 5-percent limit, probably ending the effectiveness of this guideline. Spiraling wage hikes would reinforce the trend toward double-digit inflation and force the government to use unpopular contractionary fiscal and monetary policies. If the strike is prolonged, some sectors of the economy could need considerable time to recover. Export and import traffic is paralyzed, and some export markets may be lost permanently, thus worsening Britain's balance of payments.
The Conservatives, who had attempted during the past year to woo the unions with a more conciliatory line, now are seeking to capitalize on the government's dilemma by demanding controls on the abuses of union power. The firm Tory line may strike a responsive chord in the electorate, which five years ago did not support the Conservatives in a showdown with the unions.
Callaghan has proposed limited programsalready criticized by both union leaders and employersdesigned to calm the situation. But the government is clearly on the defensive andif it survivesthe basic points raised by the Conservatives will become the focal point of debate concerning the trade unions.  25X1  25X1
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PALESTINIANS: PNC Political Program	
The 21-point program passed by th National Council yesterday breaks litt and maintains the PLO's hardline stance East peace issues. Moderates won part the PLO-Jordan dialogue, but most other extremist views.	le new ground e on most Middle ial approval for
The program rejects the Camp Davidismisses UN Security Council Resolution participation in any international con with the Palestine question is authori	on 242. PLO ference dealing
A Palestinian government-in-exile in the program, which repeats the PNC' call for an "independent Palestinian s the phrase "without any restriction or program praises Jordan's rejection of ports continuing talks, cites US aggre the Palestinian people, Soviet-Palesti and calls on Arab states to support the movement" against President Sadat.	s March 1977 tate" and adds condition." The Camp David, sup- ssion against nian solidarity,
Radicals apparently inserted lang be interpreted as endorsing PLO guerri Israel from Jordana demand that is s	

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GUINEA: Control of Soviet Ships

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President Toure has directed that regulations governing Soviet use of Conakry harbor be tightened,

Soviet warships will be given access to designated anchorage or dock sites only after advance request in writing. Lower ranking Guinean officials think this may prompt Moscow to seek naval-access rights elsewhere. Toure's action follows his recent reduction in the number of Soviet military advisers in Guinea and other gradual moves to lessen Guinean military dependence on the USSR. is seeking to project a more nonaligned image and attract greater Western economic aid. His latest move could presage a decision in coming months to end the small Soviet naval patrol that has operated off Conakry since 1970. Toure's reconciliation last year with Senegal, Ivory Coast, and France--which shelter many Guinean exiles -- has greatly eased Guinean security concerns. 25X1

SOUTH KOREA - NORTH KOREA: Call for Talks

At his annual press conference today, South Korean President Pak once again called for a resumption of North - South Korean talks. The South Koreans almost certainly do not anticipate a positive response from the North; Pak, however, evidently sees his proposals as demonstrating Seoul's flexibility. Pak appealed for talks "at any time and at any levels" without preconditions. North Korea has consistently turned aside such proposals since the Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue stalled in 1973. While the North Koreans maintain that the door is open to negotiations, they insist that the South must terminate its anti-Communist laws, its "Two Koreas" policy, and the control of domestic dissent.

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CUBA-CHINA: Trade Protocol

The 1979 Cuban-Chinese trade protocol, under negotiation since November, was signed in Beijing (Peking) yesterday. The protocol is negotiated annually and is signed around this time each year. No details were provided, but we believe that total trade will approximate last year's level of about \$125 million - \$150 million. Despite their strained political relations since Cuba's large-scale military intervention in Africa in 1975, Cuba and China have continued to maintain commercial relations, albeit at a level roughly half that of the early 1970s.

#### ZAMBIA-CHINA-USSR: Military Relations

Because of domestic pressure in Zambia to improve defenses against Rhodesian cross-border raids, President Kaunda has reportedly recalled some 200 military personnel from ground and air training courses in China. returnees include pilots for Zambia's Chinese-built fighters. To our knowledge, the Zambians still have not accepted a \$200-million military assistance package from the USSR that would call for restructuring the Zambian military along Soviet lines. The Zambians are, however, awaiting a large shipment of Soviet weapons and plan to send 50 officers to the USSR in March for weapons training. The Zambians have not received MIGs from the USSR, as reported earlier, but they are discussing the purchase of MIG-21s with the Soviets and have sent 10 pilots to the USSR for a six-month MIG-21 training course. None of these steps will significantly improve Zambian military capabilities any time soon, but they may temporarily take some of the pressure by the military off Kaunda.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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SPAIN: Military Discontent

Military unhappiness with Prime M government is clearly on the rise in S extent the discontent stems from the b litical uncertainties and persistent e that trouble all Spaniards, but the mo. 5X1 mediate issue is the continued terrori separatist organization ETA. 5X1 key military leaders remain loyal to K and that the terrorists are unlikely to lative election set for 1 March. the next government will face ser 25X1 in attempting to formulate policies the ther alienate the military.

While the Suarez government's per to cope effectively with terrorism has the military's confidence in it, the a united in their understanding that the ally attempting to force the military repressive measures in hopes of aggrava the situation in the Basque provinces. **(**1

Although the King is no longer he high esteem in all military circles as marily as a result of his defense of t ment--he is still looked upon as being politics, and the great majority of the leadership remains in his camp. There one with the stature to replace him as force in Spain today.

First Deputy Prime Minister for De Mellado and Interior Minister Martin V inet members most closely identified wi ment's policy in dealing with the terro

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	they are consequently the most maligned tary and public order forces. Gutierrez particular appears to have little if any armed forces, where he is seen as a polidays are clearly numbered. His departure election would be a political defeat for neither he nor Martin Villa is indispense	Mellado in support in tician, and he before the Suarez, but	the
	The government is acutely aware of tion in military and public order circle all it can to increase its effectiveness terrorism.	s and is doir	ng
	In any case, there is a wide range can be taken by the government and by the fore the latter would feel required to local military coup with all the civil structure would entail. Some of these options suspension of certain civil and judicial Basque provinces, are already under activition and may be implemented at any time. The measures involving direct military particles imposing martial laware far less like have no information that the military is press for such action.	e military be aunch a class ife such a s, such as the rights in the consideration suckely, and we	e- si- ne ne -
	Military dissatisfaction is focused the terrorist problem. Regional demands nomy, labor strikes, the economic situate possibility of a Socialist victory in the	for more aut ion, and the e March elec-	-co-
25X1	tion are lesser but still important conce	erns.	
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In sum, with the national election less than 45
days awayand barring an unforeseen calamityit is
likely that the military will adopt a wait-and-see at-
titude combined with continuing institutional pressure 25X1
on the government to take stronger legal measures
against terrorists.
the current regime will not fall because of terrorism.
Similarly, most agree that the post-election period will

be more critical. The continuation of a democratic regime will depend in great part on the election results, subsequent coalitions and government policies,

and the handling of regional autonomy demands.

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#### OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

#### Romania-USSR

Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei will make an official visit to the USSR at the end of the month, according to simultaneous announcements in Moscow and Bucharest last night.

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COMMENT:	
	Bucha-
rest's willingness to send Andrei to Moscow sugg	
that the two governments are ready to discuss th	eir dif-
ferences, including Romania's reluctance to acce	pt in-
creased defense appropriations and further integ	ration
of the Warsaw Pact command. The planned visit m	ay also
have played a part in Moscow's failure thus far	to at-
tack Bucharest for its criticism of the Vietname	
vasion of Kampuchea.	
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#### China-Pakistan

Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiennian (Li Hsien-nien) begins a three-day, official visit to Pakistan tomorrow on his way home from Africa. The US Embassy in Islamabad reports today that it was surprised by the announcement Wednesday, noting it had no hints of the trip in its extensive contacts with Chinese and Pakistani officials over the past two weeks. The Embassy surmises that the trip is designed, in part, to allay Pakistani concerns over Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee's upcoming trip to Beijing (Peking) and to discuss developments in Iran.

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#### Cuba-US

The US Interests Section in Havana yesterday reported its views on the formal Cuban note of the previous day protesting the overflight by a US SR-71 aircraft on 12 November. Noting the long delay in filing the protest, the routine courier delivery, and the fact that both Castros had publicly condemned the overflight, the Interests Section sees the note as pro forma, lacking any direct threat of action against future overflights. It added that President Castro's failure to make counterthreats apparently reflects his inclination, probably at Soviet urging, not to aggravate the MIG-23 controversy with the US.

### Japan - West Germany

Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda today completes two days of consultations in Bonn with Foreign Minister Genscher. The US Embassy in Tokyo has learned from a ranking Japanese Foreign Ministry official that Sonoda was expected to raise the subject of preparations for the seven-nation Western summit at Tokyo in June, seeking West German views on how to make it a success. The official said, however, that Japanese press stories erred in alleging that the summit would be the focus of the consultations. Sonoda has had wide-ranging, frank discussions before with Genscher and anticipated more of the same on this occasion, according to the official.

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#### Netherlands-China

Dutch Foreign Minister Van Der Klaauw arrived in Beijing (Peking) last night, the first visit there by a
Western official of his rank since the normalization of
Sino-US relations and the invasion of Kampuchea. His
talks with Chinese officials will cover political matters
in general and prospects for economic cooperation.

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